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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
At 8:50 am Pakistan Standard Time on October 8, 2005, an earthquake of magnitude Mw 
7.6 shook northern Pakistan and the Kashmir region.  With over 70,000 dead, more than 80,000 
injured, and more than two million homeless, the earthquake ranks amongst the worst natural 
disasters in the history of Pakistan and the Indian subcontinent.  According to early estimates 
(WB-ADB, 2005), the total cost of reconstruction of the damaged infrastructure and rehabilitation 
is in excess of five billion dollars in direct losses.  
 
The Mid-America Earthquake Center and Rice University with assistance from the Higher 
Education Commission of Pakistan, and several other organizations, dispatched an earthquake 
field reconnaissance team to assess the damage, collect data, and derive lessons from the damaging 
earthquake. Two main objectives were considered in the assembly and dispatch of the field 
reconnaissance team. These are: (i) gain a first hand experience of the impact of the earthquake and 
lessons to be learned pertinent to consequence-based earthquake risk management, and (ii) explore 
and identify avenues of collaboration for long-term earthquake preparedness encompassing 
research, education, and design code development.  
 
This Quicklook report presents first hand observations, summarizes data collected from 
various sources in Pakistan and includes early analysis of the available strong-motion records. It 
provides a brief background on the seismo-tectonic setting of the region, offers preliminary 
observations on damage to the built infrastructure, reviews socio-economic consequences of the 
earthquake, and outlines early thoughts on reconstruction priorities and long-term disaster 
planning. It is stressed that the statistics quoted in the report are preliminary and not universally 
accepted. 
 
A review of the earthquake history of the area confirms that the Kashmir earthquake, 
though large by normal standards, is considered ‘moderate’ when viewed in the context of 
earthquake generation potential of the India-Tibet subduction region. Moreover, theoretical 
studies indicate that the energy stored along the Himalayan arc suggests a high probability of 
several massive earthquakes of magnitude > 8.0 in the future. Strong-motion data from the 
affected region conforms to attenuation relationships for subduction zones, thrust mechanisms 
earthquakes derived from other regions. Correlative analyses of a highly rigid bridge in the 
epicentral zone served as a point of reference for the peak ground parameters inferred from 
attenuation relationships. Based on the available data, contour maps for peak ground acceleration 
in the horizontal and vertical directions are derived, pending further confirmation. A suite of 
records from previous earthquakes, selected on the basis of mechanism and peak ground 
parameters, is proposed for future studies. 
 
The structural damage observed is expected, owing to the poor quality of construction of 
traditional housing and modern RC structures not designed to resist earthquake action. It should 
also be noted that preliminary analysis of a set of strong-motion records from Abbottabad 
indicated that shaking in the epicentral region was severe; comparable to shaking in previous 
major damaging earthquakes in Turkey, the USA and Japan. Since design wind loads are rather 
modest in the regions, even engineered structures are not expected to resist significant lateral loads 
since they were not designed to resist significant wind loads. The MAE Center-Rice University 
Team concluded that engineered structures were fairly well constructed, and cases of failure were 
due mainly to layout defects, such as soft ground storey, short columns, irregular plans and 
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elevations, as well as lack of maintenance on a few cases. Bridge structures on the whole 
responded well to the earthquake with only very few cases of heavy damage, and fewer cases of 
collapse. 
 
The earthquake emphasized the impact of slope failures, site response and the effect of 
topography. Tens of miles of slope failures were observed, and many other slopes remain 
precariously unstable awaiting a triggering event. At the time of printing this report, news has 
emerged that such an event has indeed occurred, with a magnitude of 6.7. With regard to site 
response features, in at least two cases, in Balakot and Muzaffarabad, significant ridge effects were 
observed, leading to totally disproportionate levels of damage, relative to other regions and the 
severity of shaking expressed by the peak ground parameters. 
 
Lifelines behaved reasonably well, with pockets of severe damage that has had a 
significant short-term effect on search and rescue operations in the region. The impact on 
healthcare and education has been severe. Nonetheless, recovery has been more rapid than 
observed by members of the MAE Center-Rice University Team who have studied several 
previous earthquakes worldwide. The response of Government organizations, the Pakistani Army 
and private companies was impressive, as evidenced by the rapid return to a manageable situation 
and effective distribution of national and international aid. The rapid move from search and rescue 
to emergency management and to planning for the reconstruction phase was deemed by the Team 
to be admirable. 
 
It is too early to draw conclusive lessons that are sufficient to steer the reconstruction effort 
and the necessary planning for future earthquakes and other potential disasters. However, it is clear 
that priorities should be set rather cautiously in order to use the devastating impact of the Kashmir 
earthquake in as positive a framework as possible, to renovate the built environment based on 
rigorous redesign and reconstruction criteria, benefiting from available technologies, whilst 
adapting them to Pakistani realities and circumstances. The Field Mission Team advises caution in 
selecting materials, systems and experts to aid in the reconstruction efforts, and recommends 
drawing a global approach balancing short- and long-term needs, recovery and planning for future 
earthquakes, critical and popular facilities (e.g. hospitals, schools, power plants, etc as critical 
facilities, versus sports and recreational facilities, convention centers, etc as popular facilities). It is 
also critical to rapidly develop design and construction guidance that is based on rigorous and 
confirmed engineering knowledge, whilst maintaining simplicity and ease of application. Finally, 
filtering of overseas knowledge and experience is another critical issue, in order that homogeneous 
and nationally-applicable retrofitting approaches and emergency planning measures are adopted 
and applied uniformly in Pakistan. Preliminary recommendations are included at the end of this 
report. 
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2. OVERVIEW OF THE EARTHQUAKE AND LOSSES 
 
 A powerful earthquake of magnitude Mw 7.6 shook Kashmir and the adjoining northern 
part of Pakistan on October 8, 2005 at 8:50 a.m. local time. With its epicenter estimated at about 10 
miles from Muzaffarabad, the administrative capital of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and 65 
miles NNE of Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan as shown in Figure 2.1, the earthquake caused the 
most damage in AJK and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Some losses 
were reported in the Indian controlled part of Kashmir and Southern Afghanistan.  
 
The earthquake nucleated in the active tectonic region of the northern part of the Indian 
subcontinent. The South Asian plate comprising Pakistan, India and Bangladesh is continuously 
moving northward, colliding with and subducting under the Eurasian plate, thus triggering 
earthquakes and forming the Himalayan mountain ranges. Because of their low frequency, the 
historical memory and awareness about these earthquakes appears to have faded. The indigenous 
practice of lighter weight, timber-laced construction has gradually given way to relatively more 
massive masonry and reinforced concrete construction which provides adequate protection against 
harsh elements but is often poorly constructed to withstand strong earthquakes.  The current 
building code and regulatory requirements for safety against earthquakes are outdated and seldom 
enforced. The existing seismic design guidelines (not an enforceable code) are based on the 1970s 
Uniform Building Code and include an incomplete and non-rigorous seismic zoning map. The 
guidelines are not mandatory. 
 
ISLAMABAD
MUZFFARABAD
Peshawar
Epicenter
 
 
Figure 2.1 General location of the 8 October 2005 Kashmir earthquake 
 
Several local and international organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, have surveyed the earthquake damage (e.g. WB-ADB, 2005). Table 2.1 
summarizes the impact in terms of loss of life and damage to housing. Field observations and the 
statistics given in Table 2.1 suggest damage to a broad range of construction which included both 
engineered and non-engineered structures. The high economic losses associated with this 
earthquake mirror the recorded extensive damage and the loss of human life. 
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Table 2.1 Overall impact of the earthquake on the population (WB-ADB, 2005) 
Indicator Latest Estimate 
Area Affected 30,000 sq km 
Population Affected Between 3.2 million and 3.5 million 
Deaths 73,000 
Injured 79,000 
Houses 400,153 (damaged and destroyed) 
Families affected 500,000 (seven persons per family on average) 
Notes: The death toll has been revised upwards to more than 80,000 
 
The exact magnitude of the economic impact of this earthquake remains yet to be fully 
determined but the current estimates, summarized in Table 2.2, suggest that the direct economic 
cost is over $5 billion. This estimate does not account for loss of direct and indirect economic 
activity, such as business interruption and loss of market shares for Pakistani products.  
 
Table 2.2: Economic cost of the earthquake (WB-ADB, 2005) 
Category US $ M US $ M 
Relief  1,092 
Death and Injury Compensation  205 
Early Recovery  301 
Restoration of Livelihoods  97 
Reconstruction  3,503 
Of which short term Reconstruction 450  
Of which Medium/Long term Reconstruction 3053  
Total  5,198 
 
The losses in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
(AJK) are given in         Table 2.3.  It is estimated that 72,705 people were killed and 68,157 were 
injured as a consequence of the earthquake1. Over 72,019 buildings were completely destroyed 
and additional 182,886 buildings were severely damaged.  
 
        Table 2.3 Overall numbers of losses caused by Kashmir Earthquake for NWFP and AJK areas, as of  Nov. 12 
(AJK: http://www.ajk.gov.pk, NWFP: WB-ADB) 
Life Buildings District 
Dead Injured Fully D. Partially D. 
Damage length 
of Road (km) 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
Shangla 423 957 15,880 11,087 405 
Manshera (Balakot) 24,511 30,585 32,293 43,925 671 
Kohistan 661 639 4,504 18,737 396 
Abbottabad 515 1,730 7,267 27,813 306 
Batagram 3,232 3,279 29,015 8,841 284 
Sub-Total NWFP 29,342 37,190 88,959 110,403 2,062 
Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) 
Neelum 447 1,013 3,692 8,991 - 
Muzaffarbad 33,724 21,374 115,211 17,209 1237 
Bagh 8,157 6,644 48,365 18,736 461 
Rawalakot 1,025 1,909 15,362 25,770 667 
Sudhnoti 4 16 430 1,777 - 
Mirpur 6 11 0 0 - 
Sub-Total AJK 43,363 30,967 183,060 72,483 2,365 
Total 72,705 68,157 272,019 182,886 4,427 
 
                                                 
1 As of November 12, 2005 
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Table 2.4 provides detailed damage statistics for buildings.  Medical facilities and schools 
were among the hardest hit structures. Debris from the collapsed buildings is estimated to be more 
than 50 million tons. It is estimated that about 40% of telecommunication exchanges and 15% of 
telephone lines in AJK and 30% of exchanges and 8% of lines in NWFP were disrupted. 
Approximately 30-40% of water supply is believed to have been affected as a result of the 
earthquake in both AJK and NWFP (WB-ADB, 2005). Power distribution networks and fuel 
supplies were also severely impacted. As a result of this earthquake, approximately one third of 
primary and tertiary roads and one fourth of secondary roads in the two provinces became 
impassable, mostly from landslides, thus hampering the immediate relief effort.  
 
Table 2.4 Statistics for damaged buildings caused by Kashmir Earthquake for NWFP and AJK areas, Nov 12 (AJK: 
http://www.ajk.gov.pk, NWFP: WB-ADB) 
Housing Educational Institutes 
Medical 
Facilities 
Other 
Government 
Buildings 
MISC Structures 
(Shops, 
Mosques, etc) 
Sub-Total  District 
Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full Partial 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) 
Shangla 15,661 10,821 206 247 13 19 - - - - 15,880 11,087 
Manshera  31,323 43,282 935 624 35 19 - - - - 32,293 43,925 
Kohistan 4,350 18,395 154 320  22 - - - - 4,504 18,737 
Abbottabad 6,961 27,051 295 736 11 26 - - - - 7,267 27,813 
Batagram 28,712 8,656 268 180 35 5 - - - - 29,015 8,841 
Sub-Total 87,007 108,205 1,858 2,107 94 91 - - - - 88,959 110,403 
Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK) 
Neelum 3,692 7,215 0 75 0 9 0 2 0 1,690 3,692 8,991 
Muzaffarbad 108,157 17,120 929 0 103 0 77 89 5,945 0 115,211 17,209 
Bagh 47,619 18,226 511 240 49 40 186 76 0 154 48,365 18,736 
Rawalakot 15,086 25,405 125 275 16 19 78 71 57 0 15,362 25,770 
Sudhnoti 429 1,719 1 54 0 2 0 0 0 2 430 1,777 
Mirpur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sub-Total 174,983 69,685 1,566 644 168 70 341 238 6,002 1,846 183,060 72,483 
Total 261,990 177,890 3,424 2,751 262 161 341 238 6,002 1,846 272,019 182,886 
 
Muzaffarabad, the administrative capital of AJK with a population of over one million was 
the single most affected city with more than 23,000 killed. The city experienced extensive damage 
to private homes, public buildings, hospitals, schools, road networks, bridges, and 
telecommunication facilities. It is emphasized that statistics are continuously being updated. 
     
(a)                                                                                            (b) 
Figure 2.2 Muzaffarabad, (a) view from the south and (b) residential areas in the north  (note landslides in (b)) 
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The MAE Center-Rise University (MCRU) team visited the most severely damaged areas 
in both Muzaffarabad and Balakot. The field visit details, composition of the team, and a list of 
organizations and individuals the team interacted with are provided in Appendix A. Figure 2.3 
shows the travel route of the team as recorded through the GPS travel log. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Map of northern Pakistan showing the travel route and the major cities visited by the MCRU team. Thick 
color lines represent the GPS log of the route. 
 
The subsequent sections of this Quicklook report provide more detailed information and 
discussion on the regional seismo-tectonic setting, performance of the built infrastructure, and 
geotechnical observations, as well as the social and economic impact of the earthquake.  
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3. SEISMOLOGICAL FEATURES 
 
3.1 TECTONIC SETTING 
 
The collision of India with Asia has resulted in the flexural deformation of the Indian 
sub-continent with a half-wavelength of approximately 670 km, giving rise to stresses that are 
responsible for many of the earthquakes in central India. The largest of India’s earthquakes, 
however, occur on the northern boundary of the Indian plate where it descends beneath southern 
Tibet (Bilham and Ambraseys, 2005).  
 
The Kashmir earthquake, which affected Kashmir, Jammu and the North-West Frontier 
Province of Pakistan, is associated with the great plate boundary region as shown in Figure 3.1, 
where the Indian Plate is subducting under the Asian Plate. The tectonic movement in the region is 
responsible for the creation of the Himalayan mountain ranges through compressive and bending 
stresses. The subduction mechanism has triggered a few great and several intermediate 
earthquakes in a band of about 50-80 km width and an arc length of about 2500 kms (Bilham, 
http://cires.colorado.edu/~bilham/). The recent event lies at the western tip of the active 
subduction Himalayan belt. 
 
Figure 3.1 Global tectonic setting of the Kashmir earthquake within the Indian-Asian plates subduction region 
(note: credit for this graphic is unknown, since it is third-hand) 
 
Table 3.1 lists historical earthquakes in the region with those close to the location of the 
recent Kashmir earthquake highlighted in red. 
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Table 3.1 Historical earthquakes associated with the subduction region (Bilham and Ambraseys, 2005) 
Event Mw Lat. (°N) Long. (°E) Year Month Day Moment Cum moment Rate (mm/yr)
 Lo Mustang   8.2 29.5 83 1505  June   6 2.14E + 28 2.14E + 28 79.2 
 Srinagar   7.6 33.5 75.5 1555  September    2.69E + 27 2.41E + 28 8.1 
 Uttarpradesh   7.5 30 80 1720  July   15 1.91E + 27 2.60E + 28 2.2 
 Uttarpradesh   8.1 31.5 79 1803  September   1 1.51E + 28 4.11E + 28 2.5 
 Nepal   7.7 27.7 85.7 1833  August   26 3.80E + 27 4.49E + 28 2.5 
 Srinagar   6.4 34.1 74.6 1885  May   29 4.27E + 25 4.50E + 28 2.2 
 Kangra   7.8 33 76 1905  April   4 6.03E + 27 5.10E + 28 2.3 
 Bashahr   6.4 31.5 77.5 1906  February   27 5.13E + 25 5.10E + 28 2.3 
 Uttaranchal   7.3 29.9 80.5 1916  August   28 8.32E + 26 5.19E + 28 2.3 
 Uttaranchal   6.5* 30.3 80 1926  July   26 6.00E + 25 5.19E + 28 2.3 
 Nepal-Bihar   8.1 27.6 87.1 1934  January   15 1.82E + 28 7.01E + 28 3.0 
 West Nepal   7* 28.5 83.5 1936  May   7 1.00E + 27 7.11E + 28 3.0 
 Shillong   6.8 27 92 1941  January   21 5.01E + 25 7.12E + 28 3.0 
 Uttaranchal   6.5* 30.3 80 1945  June   4 6.00E + 25 7.12E + 28 3.0 
 Chamba   6.3 32.8 76.1 1945  June   22 3.16E + 25 7.13E + 28 3.0 
 Assam   7.3* 28.8 93.7 1947  July   29 8.30E + 26 7.21E + 28 3.0 
 Assam-Tibet   8.5 28.7 96.6 1950  August   15 5.62E + 28 1.28E + 29 5.3 
 Anantnang   5.6 33.6 75.3 1967  February   20 3.16E + 24 1.28E + 29 5.1 
 West Nepal   6.5* 29.6 81.1 1980  July   29 6.00E + 25 1.28E + 29 5.0 
 Uttarkashi   6.8* 30.8 78.8 1991  October   21 1.80E + 26 1.29E + 29 4.8 
 Chamoli   6.4* 30.5 79.4 1999  March   29 5.20E + 25 1.29E + 29 4.8 
*Indicates magnitude adapted from other catalogues. 
 
The Kashmir earthquake fits the pattern and fills a gap identified through GPS 
measurements and long-term geodetic observations of the Himalayan arc. Its association with a 
particular fault is still an issue of debate. This is typical of collision regions, as opposed to 
strike-slip or normal faulting where the causative fault is often well-delineated. Pending further 
investigations, the most recent interpretation of the fault mechanism and local fault association is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2 MACRO-SEISMIC DATA AND FAULT MECHANISM 
 
The earthquake struck at 8:50:40 am local time (03:50:40 coordinated universal time UTC) 
on October 8, 2005. The USGS magnitude is Mw=7.6, and the location coordinates are 
34.493N-73.629E, with a focal depth of 26 kms (16.2 miles). A very large number of aftershocks 
were recorded, reaching more than 1000 in the first few weeks of magnitudes up to 6. A definitive 
identification of surface manifestations of the fault rupture has not been possible thus far, and is 
unlikely to occur in the future. It is likely that the fault rupture is ‘blind’, i.e. it stopped a few 
kilometers short of the surface. It is the opinion of the MCRU team that the fractures reported in 
the literature are secondary and not associated directly with the fault rupture. Moreover, the 
extensive land sliding observed is also not directly associated with the fault rupture. Satellite 
imaging (COMET; http://comet.nerc.ac.uk/) provided a reasonable estimate of the location of the 
fault and its extent by mapping the shortening on the surface. The presumed fault trace is shown in 
Figure 3.2. The direction of the fault, being N27E to N30E, is confirmed from more than one 
source. The length of the rupture is reported by Harvard Seismology to be about 90 km, with a 
width of about 50 km. The fault plane dips about 37 degrees and the mechanism is mostly thrust 
(Harvard and others fault plane solution shows a mildly oblique fault mechanism). The average 
slip is between 2-4 meters, confirmed from several sources (COMET, Harvard, Bilham, 2005). 
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Figure 3.2 Location and extent of fault rupture (COMET) 
 
The MCRU team did not undertake a systematic damage assessment survey for intensity 
assessment. However, the team estimates that many places in Muzaffarabad suffered intensity 
MMI to X, contrary to reports currently available where lower intensities were reported. MMI to X 
is described as: Most buildings and their foundations are destroyed. Some bridges are destroyed. 
Dams are seriously damaged. Large landslides occur. Water is thrown on the banks of canals, 
rivers, lakes. The ground cracks in large areas. Railroad tracks are bent slightly. The same 
intensity, with a tendency towards XI, is assigned by the team to Balakot, where semi-engineered 
buildings collapsed en masse, and some well engineered structures, such as hotels, were destroyed. 
Intensity XI is described as: Most buildings collapse. Some bridges are destroyed. Large cracks 
appear in the ground. Underground pipelines are destroyed. Railroad tracks are badly bent. 
Absence of evidence should not be construed as evidence of absence. Therefore, the absence of 
railroads and collapsed bridges should not lead to under-estimating the intensity. Because of the 
rugged topology, the epicentral region has a rather sparse network of bridges. These bridges are 
either very slender deck structures as is typical of suspension bridges, or have massive reinforced 
concrete short span girders, both of which are less vulnerable to earthquakes than the 
medium-to-large span reinforced concrete bridges. 
 
A closer examination of the rupture region indicates an axis running through Muzaffarabad 
and Balakot, as shown in Figure 3.3. This zone overlies the complex faulting mechanism shown in 
Figure 3.4. The latter figure explains the local faulting mechanism while linking it to the global 
tectonic setting by showing the Indian plate dipping under the Asian plate, through a band of 
complex secondary faults. 
 
It should be noted that much of the information available on the region under consideration 
is gleaned from relatively recent instrumentation records. It is therefore highly likely that the 
seismicity of the region is in general under-estimated, or at least mis-represented. In Ambraseys 
and Douglas (2004) it is shown that historical data is subject to interpretation and is on the whole 
inadequate. 
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Figure 3.3 Rupture region (adapted from http://cires.colorado.edu/~bilham/Kashmir%202005.htm) 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Cross section approximately along the blue line in the previous figure (as above) 
 
3.3 STRONG GROUND MOTION 
 
At the time of writing this report, only three strong-motion acceleration records (Mahmood, 
2005) were made available to the MCRU team, and none are from the heavily damaged regions of 
Balakot and Muzaffarabad. Three records, each with three components, are available for Nilore, 
Murree and Abbottabad (Figure 3.5). The three records are reproduces in Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7, 
and Figure 3.8. Their elastic and inelastic spectra are given in Figure 3.9. In each plot, elastic (5%) 
and ductility 2, 4 and 6 spectra are shown for the higher PGA of the two horizontal components.  
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Figure 3.5 Location of recoded data Figure 3.6 Strong Motion Records at Abbottabad 
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Figure 3.7 Strong Motion Records at Murree Figure 3.8 Strong Motion Records at Nilore 
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(b) Murree, NS component (C) Nilore, NS component 
Figure 3.9 Spectra for horizontal component of each record 
 
The signal from Abbottabad is the most usable of the three available records, since it is 
obtained from an area where significant damage has occurred. The two other records are rather 
weak. It is important to note that scaling the Nilore and Murree records is not advised. There are 
certain features in their spectra, namely the relatively high amplification in the long period range 
(up to 3 seconds period), that would be exceptionally demanding on long period structures if the 
records are scaled to render them useable in back-analysis. Attention is hereafter focused on the 
Abbottabad record. The 5% elastic spectrum shows a relatively broad range of high amplification, 
from 0.4 to 2.0 seconds. The highest amplification is about 4.0. This is compared to the value of 
2.6, which is the 84 percentile amplification factor given by Newmark and Hall (1982), thus 
indicating the relative severity of the Abbottabad record. The range of periods corresponding to 
high amplifications is also unusual, extending to 2.0 seconds. Such a feature would result in 
relatively high demand imposed on both short and intermediate-long period structures. The 
constant ductility spectra shown in Figure 3.9 indicate rather low strength demand for highly 
ductile structures (of ductility of 4.0 or more), and average demands for intermediate ductility 
structures (of ductility around 2.0). Table 3.2 contrasts amplification factors from the Abbottabad 
acceleration signal with records from the Northridge (USA, 1994), Hyogo-ken (Japan, 1995) and 
Kocaeli (Turkey, 1999) earthquakes. 
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Table 3.2: Acceleration response (proportional to force demand) for ductility=2, at given periods, in %g 
Earthquake-Record T=0.5 s T=1.0 s T=1.5 s T=2.0 s 
H-K Nambu JMA 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.2 
Northridge Sylmar 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Northridge Arleta 0.3 0.25 0.15 0.05 
Kocaeli Yarimca 0.3 0.3 0.22 0.18 
Kashmir Abbottabad 0.45 0.30 0.26 0.19 
 
Table 3.2 shows that the Abbottabad record is less demanding than the known rich records 
of JMA Kobe and Sylmar Northridge for short periods, but close to them in the long period range. 
It is as demanding as the Yarimca record, known to have devastated the area hit by the earthquake 
of August 1999 (Elnashai, 2000). Taking into account how far Abbottabad is from the epicentral 
region, the overall impression the above brief review yields is that the built environment in the 
region affected was hit by very powerful strong ground motion. Further analysis will be provided 
in the full MAE Center report on the Kashmir earthquake. 
 
The MCRU team has also obtained peak ground acceleration data at two sites (Khan, 2005), 
namely Tarbela Dam and Barotha Power Complex. The peak ground accelerations are as shown 
below: 
 
Tarbela Accelerograph Record: 
MED Crest Station 45+12: 0.14g 
P/H Plunge Pool on Rock Sta 63+42: 0.10g 
MED Crest Station 83+42: 0.12g 
AD-2 Crest Station 8-0: 0.16g 
AD-1 Crest Station 22+50: 0.10g 
AUX Spillway SMA: 0.10g 
 
Barotha Power Complex Accelerographs record: 
Power Complex base: 0.04g 
Power Complex top: 0.11g 
 
To provide records for back-analysis in areas where no recordings are known to exist, the 
available peak ground accelerations from the five sites were used to select attenuation 
relationships that may then be used to derive ground parameters maps for the region affected by 
the earthquake. The criteria for selecting the attenuation relationships to be investigated were (i) 
subduction zones, thrust mechanisms, (ii) large magnitude, and (iii) a large and uniformly 
processed data base. The candidate attenuation relationships are given in Table 3.3 below 
alongside predictions for the various important sites. The relationships are plotted for the Kashmir 
earthquake characteristics for the horizontal component, assuming stiff and soft soil. The plots are 
shown in Figure 3.10. The peak ground acceleration values from Tarbela, Barotha, Abbottabad, 
Nilore and Murree are also shown along with the distance error bars of +/- 10 km. Distances are 
measured from the presumed fault zone described previously. Based on the fidelity of prediction of 
the peak ground acceleration values, two attenuation relationships are feasible; Campbell (1997) 
and Ambraseys and Douglas (2005). The former tends to give lower estimates than the latter. 
Taking into account that the pga at Nilore is probably affected by the dimensions of the raft where 
the instrument was anchored, and taking a conservative approach, the relationship of Ambraseys 
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and Douglas is selected. It is noteworthy that the relationship of Campbell (1997) would give 
marginally higher pga in the near-source region. This observation should be considered by 
analysts when using and scaling the records selected in this report. Finally it is noteworthy that the 
vertical ground motion is very well predicted by the selected attenuation relationship, an 
observation that supports the effect of the raft foundation mentioned above. 
 
Table 3.3: Prediction of horizontal peak ground acceleration for each attenuation relationship 
Krinitzsky et al  
(1988) 
Dahle et al   
(1995) 
Campbell  
 (1997) 
Schmidt et al  
 (1997) 
Ambraseys et al 
(2005) Location (distance from fault) 
Stiff  Soft Stiff  Soft Stiff  Soft Stiff  Soft Stiff  Soft 
Tarbela (80 km) 0.061 0.757 0.094 0.130 0.042 0.055 0.114 0.127 0.111 0.135 
Barotha P. C. (140km) 0.046 0.563 0.057 0.079 0.017 0.023 0.065 0.072 0.071 0.087 
Muzaffarabad (4 km) 0.079 0.968 0.458 0.635 0.720 0.800 0.751 0.835 0.659 0.805 
Balakot (10 km) 0.078 0.964 0.345 0.478 0.471 0.548 0.531 0.591 0.486 0.594 
Abbottabod (39 km) 0.073 0.903 0.16 0.221 0.124 0.155 0.21 0.234 0.194 0.237 
Islabamad (98 km) 0.056 0.692 0.079 0.110 0.031 0.04 0.094 0.104 0.094 0.115 
 
(a) PGA prediction for stiff soil (b) PGA prediction for soft soil 
Figure 3.10 Prediction of horizontal peak ground acceleration (bracketed value is suspect) 
Note: Record at Nilore (red circle) is response of raft foundation 
 
The selected attenuation relationship is plotted with its level of uncertainty as reported by 
Ambraseys and Douglas (2005), and is shown in Figure 3.11 for stiff and soft soil. Moreover, since 
thrust mechanisms often lead to high vertical ground motion, with consequential extensive damage 
(Collier and Elnashai (2001), Papazoglou and Elnashai (1996)), the companion vertical 
attenuation relationship is invoked, and plotted as shown in Figure 3.11 (b). 
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(a) PGA prediction for horizontal ground motion (b) PGA prediction for vertical ground motion 
Figure 3.11 Prediction of peak ground acceleration using equation by Ambraseys and Douglas (2005) 
 
As a prelude to the back-analysis intended for the full MAE Center report that is currently 
under development, contour maps for horizontal and vertical ground acceleration in the region 
affected by the Kashmir earthquake are generated, and shown in Figure 3.12. It is noted that the 
ground parameter values in the very close vicinity of the fault may be significantly less 
representative than elsewhere. This is because each earthquake has its own characteristics, fault 
rupture sequence, direction, and propagation. Therefore, near-source values are indicative only 
and aid in selecting records for the purposes of back-analysis. As mentioned above, the latter point 
should be taken into account when scaling records for back-analysis in regions of close proximity 
to the fault. Values at some distance from the fault, e.g. >10kms, should be reliable due to the good 
match between the measured pga values and the Ambraseys and Douglas (2005) attenuation 
relationships. 
 
  
(a) Contour map for horizontal ground motion (b) Contour map for vertical ground motion 
Figure 3.12 PGA Contour maps for the affected region (on the fault trace, accelerations of 1g or higher are possible) 
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Table 3.4: Selected records for back-analysis, two for each side, based on available information 
PGA (g) Location Earthquake Name Station Name Mw 
Fault 
Distance Soil Type Long. Trans. Verti. 
Gazli Gazli 6.7 4 km soft soil 0.616 0.721 1.288 Muzaffarabad 
(4 km) Tabas Tabas 7.4 3 km stiff soil 0.927 1.103 0.840 
Tabas Dayhook 7.4 11 km Rock 0.338 0.386 0.174 
Montenegro Bar-Skupstina O. 7.05 12 km stiff soil 0.376 0.363 0.254 Balakot (10 km) 
Montenegro Pertovac-Hotel O. 7.05 12 km stiff soil 0.455 0.306 0.213 
Tabas Boshroyeh 7.4 34 km soft soil 0.102 0.087 0.079 Abbottabad 
(39 km) Montenegro Ulcinj-Hotel O. 7.05 24 km stiff soil 0.294 0.241 0.458 
Tabas Ferdoos 7.4 94 km stiff soil 0.092 0.102 0.053 Islabamad 
(98 km) Montenegro Veliki S. S. 7.05 105 km alluvium 0.268 0.181 0.046 
Gazli (1976, Uzbekistan), Tabas (1978, Iran), and Montenegro (1979, Yugoslavia) 
 
The source mechanism, magnitude and peak ground accelerations obtained thus far were 
employed to select earthquake records for sites where extensive damage was observed. Table 3.4 
lists the selected earthquakes, two for each side with the exception of Balakot, where three records 
are selected. These records are recommended for use in loss assessment studies for the region, 
alongside the actual acceleration recordings from Nilore, Abbottabad and Murree. It is stressed 
that the Nilore record should be used with caution in view of the location of the instrument. 
 
3.4 IMPLICATIONS ON FUTURE EARTHQUAKE HAZARD AND NEEDS 
 
The Kashmir earthquake, in a regional setting, is considered to be a moderate earthquake. 
The region is susceptible to great earthquakes of magnitudes > 8.0. Estimates of slip rates vary 
considerably, and it is not the objective of this Quicklook report to resolve the differences or 
re-interpret their underlying assumptions. The most reliable estimates from the authors viewpoint 
suggest an average slip of ~ 18 mm/year (Bilham and Ambraseys, 2005), averaged over the entire 
India-Tibet collision zone. The average slip observed in earthquakes in the past 5 centuries 
amounts to less than 3 mm/year. Whereas other interpretations exist, the most likely outcome of 
the above is that there are massive earthquakes awaited, nucleating in the Himalayan arc. In the 
latter publication, it is estimated that four earthquakes of magnitude > 8.4 are required to make up 
for the slip deficit between GPS-calculated strains, and slip during earthquakes observed from year 
1500 to 2000. With the Kashmir earthquake releasing less than 10% of the energy stored in the 
collision region, many large population centers throughout northern Pakistan and India are 
exposed to serious seismic risk.  
The dearth of strong ground motion records point to the need for a well developed seismic 
monitoring network of not only the area affected by the recent earthquake, but for all of Pakistan.  
Moreover, a clearing house should be established to disseminate such data, and other information 
on the earthquake, to encourage the earthquake engineering community to undertake analysis and 
assessments, thus enriching the knowledge base and aiding in the better understanding of 
Himalayan earthquakes and their effects. 
 
4. BUILT ENVIRONMENT LOSSES 
 
Performance of the built environment and the damage sustained by various types of 
structures in Abbottabad and Balakot in NWFP, and Muzaffarabad in AJK are discussed in this 
section. The assessment of structural performance in other locations visited by the team will be 
presented in the detailed reconnaissance report to be issued from the MAE Center, alongside 
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back-analysis of buildings and bridges in the affected region. The systems considered in this 
section are primarily, (a) residential buildings, (b) hospital and school buildings, (c) road networks, 
and (d) bridges. Attention is primarily focused on the construction practice prevalent in the area in 
each of the categories above, and the common causes of failures observed. It is emphasized that the 
general observations given below are based on visual inspection with no detailed analysis or 
formal assessment. They should therefore be taken as preliminary and awaiting further studies and 
confirmation. A detailed structural damage commentary is also given by the University of 
Engineering and Technology, Peshawar (UET, 2005). 
 
4.1 RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS 
 
The October 8, 2005 earthquake left an estimated 2.8 million people in need of shelter. The 
Government of Pakistan census data indicates that about 439,880 housing units were in the 
affected area of which 261,990 housing units were completely destroyed, while 177,890 were 
damaged to various degrees. A distribution of these units in the various districts of the earthquake 
affected areas, broadly categorized as AJK and NWFP is presented in Table 2.4. Losses to the 
housing sector represent 84 percent of the total housing stock in the affected districts of AJK, and 
36 percent of housing stock in the five affected districts of NWFP. 
 
A typical residential house in the affected rural areas has a relatively small footprint of 
about 400 sq. ft. of living space, and consists of one or two main rooms, a veranda and a bath and a 
kitchen which may not be attached. A Katcha (non-permanent) house (Figure 4.1) has mud or 
stone rubble walls with a flat thatch/mud roof supported on timber beams to support heavy mud 
insulation and snow load. A Pucca (permanent) house (Figure 4.2) typically has stone rubble or 
fired brick masonry walls with cement-sand mortar and a low-pitched sheet metal or reinforced 
concrete (RC) flat slab roof. The main cause of collapse of both types is the heavy weight of the 
roof which attracts large inertia forces. The slender unreinforced walls without adequate 
connectivity to the roof could hardly withstand these inertial forces, often experiencing out of 
plane failure and collapsing under the weight of the roof. Since a thick roof is essential for 
insulation in the hostile winter season, any alteration in local construction practice should take into 
account needs other than seismic design. In relatively more accessible small towns, the use of 
masonry blocks with a reinforced concrete slab has become increasingly popular.  One could also 
notice reinforced concrete frames with infill walls in mid to large size towns such as Balakot and 
Muzaffarabd. While many of such semi-engineered buildings completely collapsed or suffered 
serious damage, the others survived the earthquake with relatively small damage. The nature of the 
damage points to the usual culprits of poor quality construction, deficient detailing, and lack of 
seismic consideration. 
  
Figure 4.1 Collapsed Kacha house Figure 4.2 Destroyed Pucca house 
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According to AJK Government, 115,211 buildings in Muzaffarabad completely collapsed 
which constitutes 63% of the collapsed buildings in AJK. Figure 4.3 shows an interior street in the 
Medina Market which was the main shopping area in Muzaffarabad, the capital city of AJK. As 
shown in Figure 4.4, poor construction practices, use of smooth reinforcing bars, lack of continuity 
and proper detailing, and insufficient stirrups for confinement resulted in severe structural damage. 
Figure 4.5 shows an example of housing units that were made of plastered brick walls and concrete 
slabs. Old construction mixed with the new and the use of different materials in the same building 
was commonly observable. Pounding of the adjacent buildings, water tanks at the roof, 
out-of-plane failure of unreinforced masonry infills, and drastic stiffness discontinuities all 
contributed to failures of a large number of inner-town buildings in Muzaffarabad. 
 
 
  
Figure 4.3 An interior street in Madina Market, Muzaffarabad.  
 
 
  
(a) Overview of Madina Market (b) Interior street (c) Failure of Beam-column joint 
Figure 4.4 Damage in Madina Market, Muzaffarabad 
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Figure 4.5 Typical old urban and rural housing units made of brick walls and concrete slabs, Muzaffarabad. 
 
In Balakot several hotels and an entire string of shopping plazas along the main road 
collapsed or suffered severe damage. Figure 4.6 shows collapsed first story of these two-story 
plazas. It is clear from the failure mechanisms that these buildings were designed primarily for 
gravity loads with little consideration for lateral forces. As in Muzaffarabad, poor construction 
practices manifested in cold joints, lack of structural continuity, poor quality concrete, and first 
soft story appear to be the most common causes of these building failures.  
Figure 4.7 shows the total destruction of an entire community on a small hill just behind the 
main road in Balakot, where several hundred RC and masonry buildings collapsed. Pending 
further investigation, the damage is likely to be associated with intense shaking due to ridge effect. 
Depending on the ridge geometry, ridges amplify the periods corresponding to their own vibration 
modes, as well as their energy focusing effects. 
  
Figure 4.6 Structural failures due to soft story along main street in Balakot 
 
 
(a) overview of the collapse area on the hill in Balakot 
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(b) Balakot hill (c) Cold joint and use of undeformed bars 
Figure 4.7 Collapse of an entire community on a hill in Balakot 
 
4.2 HOSPITALS AND SCHOOL BUILDINGS 
 
Estimates of damage to education infrastructure (WB-ADB, 2005) indicate about 7,669 
schools were affected, ranging from primary schools to institutions of higher education. These 
include both government- and privately-owned schools. The damage to public health sector has 
also been widespread with about 574 health facilities partially or fully damaged (WB-ADB, 2005).  
 
Figure 4.8 (a,b) show the front view and the back views of the Combined Military Hospital 
(CMH) Hospital in Muzaffarabad. This was a case of soft first story and short column failure with 
strong axes of all columns aligned in one direction only. The first floor was used as car park and is 
therefore of an open plan, leading to concentration of the deformation demand on the soft story. A 
peculiar feature of this building that contributed to its failure is that the right wing had a full 
basement, while the left-wing had a half-basement with the ground slab constraining the lateral 
deformation of the basement columns. The right wing which was thus more flexible experienced 
collapse of the first story. Figure 4.9 (a-c) shows the failure of the beam-column connection, 
failure of the basement columns, and the details of the transverse reinforcement that lacked 
confinement, respectively. It should be noted that this hospital building is a good example of a 
reasonably well-designed and constructed reinforced concrete building. However, several 
violations of the basic seismic design principles regarding lateral stiffness, flexible first story, and 
beam-to-column connection details precipitated the extensive damage. 
 Figure 4.10 shows the punching of a column through the roof slab, and collapse of a hotel 
building, respectively. Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12 show the collapse of urban school buildings 
with a typical out-of-plane failure of unreinforced masonry walls.  
 
 26 Mid-America Earthquake Center
   
 
Figure 4.8 (a,b).  The front and the back views of the Combined Military Hospital (CMH) in Muzaffarabad. 
 
    
 
Figure 4.9 (a) Failure of the beam-column connection, (b) failure of the ground floor columns, and 
(c) the details of the transverse reinforcement, CMH Muzaffarabad 
 
   
 
Figure 4.10 (a) Punching failure of the slab in CMH Hospital. (b) Failure of a Hotel Building in Muzaffarabad. 
 
 27 Mid-America Earthquake Center
  
Figure 4.11 Failure of an Urban School Building Figure 4.12 Collapse of a Secondary school 
 
 
4.3 ROADS AND BRIDGE STRUCTURES 
 
Damage to the mountainous roads is largely due to landslides precipitated by the 
earthquake, as described in more detail in subsequent sections of this report.  Figure 4.13 (a,b) 
show the Balakot Bridge on the Kunhar River which was knocked off its bearing supports. Lack of 
lateral restraints allowed sliding of the bridge that resulted in one outer girder hanging freely 
(Figure 4.14 a), and other girders left with minimal bearing over their supports (Figure 4.14 b). 
Preliminary analysis of the bridge indicates that vertical motion may have played a significant role 
in reducing the vertical force on the bearings, leading to the large observed lateral displacement. 
Further detailed analysis will be included in the MAE Center full report. Figure 4.15 shows a 
Muzaffarabad bridge that also lacked lateral restraints, and was shifted from its supports. Figure 
4.16 shows a simply supported bridge over a culvert in the epicentral zone where one of the 
abutments moved more than 8 feet with respect to the other.  
 
 
   
 
Figure 4.13  (a, b).   Balakot bridge that lacked lateral constraint leading to sliding on its bearing supports. 
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Figure 4.14 (a,b). Left girder is hanging free, remaining girders have just 2 inch bearing left, Balakot Bridge 
 
  
Figure 4.15 Lateral sliding of the Balakot Bridge. Figure 4.16 Failure of Bridge abutments. 
   
Bridges along Murree to Muzaffarabad route (Figure 4.17) suffered minor damages such as 
crushing at expansion joint and abutment due to inadequate expansion/seismic gaps between deck 
segments. Suspension bridges because of their compliant characteristics experienced relatively 
little damage. A suspension bridge to the north of Muzaffarabad however completely collapsed as 
land slides toppled the suspension towers as shown in Figure 4.19.  
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Figure 4.17 Bridges along Murree to Muzaffarabad route, inspect by the MCRU Team 
 
  
(a) Abutment (b) Expansion joint 
Figure 4.18 Observed damage of bridge at Murree to Muzafarabad 
 
 
Figure 4.19 Collapsed suspension bridge due to land-sliding, North of Muzaffarabad. 
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5. GEOTECHNICAL EFFECTS 
 
The MCRU team traveled along the southern Himalayan foothills of Hazara consisting of 
the Abbottabad and Hazara formations of Cambrian age. The Abbottabad formation extends from 
the Tarbela area in the west through Abbottabad to Muzaffarabad and Balakot in the east and 
northeast (Kazmi and Qasim, 1997). The Abbottabad group is formed by a thick 
dolomite/limestone/marble sequence with quartzitic sandstone layers as well as shale and siltstone. 
The area is mountainous and is dominated by steep terrain. The city of Muzaffarabad and the town 
of Balakot lie in part within the alluvial valleys of two major rivers, the Jhelum and Kunhar Rivers 
respectively. From a geotechnical perspective the most dominant ground failure mode observed 
throughout the earthquake zone is land-sliding and slope instability. The team did not observe first 
hand evidence of liquefaction or related effects such as lateral spreading and loss of foundation 
bearing on level ground. However, in meetings with some officials it was noted that there have 
been cases where “people came out over the roof of a structure, as the entire stories got buried”. 
We continue to look for evidence of liquefaction as this can be used in the estimate of the level of 
ground shaking. The following sections highlight the preliminary observations of the site visit 
team. 
 
5.1 GROUND RUPTURE 
 
The causative fault for this earthquake appears to be a blind thrust fault and thus no surface 
manifestation of fault rupture has been hitherto identified in spite of several teams working in the 
field. The MCRU team received secondary reports about evidence of surface rupture. This issue 
remains to be resolved after detailed field investigations by others. It remains unlikely that a 
confirmed manifestation of the fault rupture will be identified after two months of investigations 
by land and air, and after the anticipated severe weather.  
 
5.2 LANDSLIDES AND SLOPE INSTABILITY 
 
Land-sliding and critical slope stability was a multi-scale problem that ranged from limited 
sloughing of surficial nature to a scale that encompassed entire mountain sides. The land-sliding 
problem in the mountains of AJK and NWFP has similarities to land-sliding that occurred in the 
mountains of Central Taiwan due to the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake. Figure 5.1 shows a large scale 
landslide in the Neela Dandi Mountain to the north of Muzaffarabad. The satellite image shows 
that the landslide blocked the Jhelum River but was rapidly breached. The landslide debris consists 
of shale, limestone and dolomite. Most landslides appear to be in a meta-stable state and can be 
readily activated due to aftershocks or rain. Landslide hazard remains high throughout the affected 
areas. 
 
Elsewhere a landslide referred to as the Dandbeh Landslide has blocked tributaries of the 
Jelhum River (Crone, 2005) and as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Lakes are developing behind these 
landslides and can potentially result in sudden and significant inundation of areas downstream if  
the earth dams are breached. These lakes will require careful monitoring to avoid potentially 
adverse impacts downstream. 
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 (a) Satellite image 
 
  
Figure 5.1 Extensive Landsliding in Neela Dandi Mountain, north of Muzaffarabad. 
 
 
  
Figure 5.2 Development of two lakes south of Muzaffarabad along a tributaries of the Jhelum River due to land-sliding, 
Dandbeh Landslide, Photo Courtesy of A. Crone, USGS and Digital Globe QucikBird II –Natural Color-Oct 27, 2005. 
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5.3 FOUNDATIONS 
 
Permanent ground deformations due to land-sliding undermined the foundations of many 
structures including buildings and bridges and resulted in extensive damage. Figure 5.3 shows 
wide spread damage at Nisar Camp north of Muzaffarabad where over 300 structures were 
severely damaged or destroyed along a ridge.  Cracks are clearly visible along the edges of the 
ridge as slopes along the edges have displaced laterally. This type of permanent ground 
deformations due to land-sliding is in part responsible for the widespread damage in Balakot as 
shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. 
 
  
Figure 5.3 Loss of bearing and complete collapse due to land-sliding and ground slumping long a hill edge, north of 
Muzaffarabad. Notice the ground cracks. 
 
  
Figure 5.4 Collapsed structures along hillside in Balakot, note also blocked road due to land-sliding. 
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Figure 5.5 Collapsed structures along ridge in Balakot, note land-sliding along the rims. 
 
5.4 RETAINING WALLS AND BRIDGE ABUTMENTS 
 
Retaining structures used to support the ground along hillside experienced significant 
damage throughout the investigated area. In areas where squat walls are used, Figure 5.6, landslide 
debris overtopped these walls sometimes resulting in damage due to impact of large boulders. In 
Balakot, a gravity retaining wall was severely damaged due to massive ground deformations 
associated with land-sliding. Bridge abutments were similarly affected as illustrated in Figure 5.7. 
 
             
 (a)      (b) 
Figure 5.6 Damage to retaining walls: (a) Landslide debris overtopping a short retaining wall that remains intact, road 
south of Muzaffarabad (b) Failure of a gravity retaining wall, Balakot. 
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(a)     (b) 
Figure 5.7 Damage to bridge abutments: (a) Collapsed pier/abutment of a suspension bridge, Pushee, Jhelum River, 
courtesy of S. Saeed, (b) sheared wing-wall for bridge abutment in Balakot.  
 
5.5 ROADS 
 
The road network throughout the earthquake zone suffered severe damage primarily due to 
land-sliding. Detailed road-by-road assessment is included in report by National Highway 
Authority, Pakistan (2005). Figure 5.8 shows that the roadway practically disappeared after the 
earthquake and had to be cleared and realigned. The shown road was paved prior to the earthquake 
and is now has merely a gravel top layer.  
 
 
 
 Figure 5.8 Extensive land-sliding along road north of Muzaffarabad leading to Ghori and points beyond. 
 
Along the roads leading to Balakot and Muzaffarabad there was ample evidence of cleared 
landslides that blocked these roads. The occurrence of these surficial landslides along the rather 
steep slopes is not unexpected. Figure 5.9 shows a close-up of typical damage to a paved roadway. 
Numerous transverse and longitudinal road ruptures were observed in the affected area. Figure 
5.10 indicates that the measured horizontal and vertical movements of road ruptures were about 30 
cm. 
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Figure 5.9 Cracked roadway due to land-sliding, north of Muzaffarabad. 
 
 
   
(a) Road rupture (b) Horizontal movement (c) Vertical Movement 
Figure 5.10 Observed road ruptures, north of Muzaffarabad 
 
 
5.6 TUNNELS 
 
Only one tunnel was encountered along the road between Murree and Muzaffarabad. The 
tunnel was originally used for northbound traffic while a bypass road along the side of the hill was 
used for southbound traffic, Figure 5.11. The bypass road was lost due to land-sliding in a 
predominantly colluvium slope. The tunnel portals were blocked due to land-sliding as well. The 
tunnel was lined with unreinforced masonry that appears to have remained intact starting from the 
south portal for about 2/3 of the tunnel length. The northern portion of the tunnel was unlined. It 
was not readily apparent whether the lining collapsed, or the tunnel was originally unlined.  
 
1 ft 
1 ft 
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(a) looking south      (b) looking north 
Figure 5.11 Land-sliding in colluvium, blocked rock, tunnel relatively intact, South of Muzaffarabad  
 
 
5.7 DAMS 
 
The Tarbela Dam is the largest earth-filled dam in the world 469 feet high and 2264 feet 
wide at the base. Shaking was felt at the dam, but no damage was reported, though there were 
reports of development of waves in the impounded lake. Peak ground accelerations from 
accelerograph records reported (Khan, 2005) at Tarbela and the related Barotha Power Complex 
are given in Section 3.3.  
 
  
(a) Location map of Tarbela Dam and Barotha Power Complex 
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(b) Tarbel Dam  (c) Barotha Power Complex 
Figure 5.12 Tarbela Dam and Barotha Power complex (http://www.infopak.gov.pk/water_reserves/ghazi-barotha.htm)
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6. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
 
6.1 IMPACT ON EDUCATION 
 
The estimated damage to education infrastructure is about US$335 million (Rs. 19.9 
billion; WB-ADB, 2005). About 7,669 schools were affected, ranging from primary schools to 
institutions of higher education and including both government owned and privately-owned 
schools (Table 6.1). Approximately 5,690 of the damaged schools are primary and middle schools. 
About half of the damaged school structures collapsed or are beyond repair and will need to be 
rebuilt. In addition to damages to educational institutions and offices, the education sector has also 
experienced severe human losses, including students, school teachers, and staff. According to 
preliminary estimates, about 18,095 students and 853 teachers and educational staff died across 
NWFP and AJK. The deaths of teachers represent not only losses to the teaching force, but also a 
loss of government investment in teacher capacity development through training.  
 
Table 6.1 Summary of Damaged Institutions by District Rural/Urban and Male/Female  
Primary through Higher Secondary (WB-ADB, 2005) 
District      Rural       Urban     Grand Total 
  Boys    Girls   Total   Boys  Girls Private Total  
       AJK            
 a. Fully Damaged                  
      MZD & Neelum   735   521    1,256   14    25    224   263    1,519   
      Bagh   388    312    700    3   4   105   112   812  
       Poonch   237   280    517   11    12   115   138   655   
 Total    1,360    1,113   2,473   28    41   444   513   2,986   
 b. Partially Damaged                 
       Damaged                  
       MZD & Neelum   104    73   177    2    3    5    10   187   
       Bagh    45    37    82    -   1    2    3    85   
       Poonch   109    129    239    5    6    18   29   268   
 Total   258    239    498   7    10   25   42   540   
       NWFP           
 a. Fully Damaged                  
       Abbottabad    133   76   209    7    3    76   86   295   
       Batagram   157    63   220    -   1   47   48   268  
       Kohistan    103   17   120    -   1    33    34    154   
       Mansehra    459   262    721    12   10   192   214    935   
       Shangla    118    45   163   1   0   42   43   206   
 Total   970    463    1,433   20    15    390   425    1,858   
 b. Partially Damaged                 
       Damaged                   
       Abbottabad    332    190    522    18    8    188   214    736   
       Batagram   105    42   147    -   1    32   33   180   
       Kohistan    215    35   250    -   1    69    70    320   
       Mansehra    306    175    481    8    7    128   143    624   
       Shangla    142    54   196    1    -   50   51   247   
 Total    1,100    496    1,596   27   17   467   511   2,107   
 
The recovery efforts to revive the educational infrastructure are estimated at US$472 
million (Rs. 28.1 billion; Table 6.2 reproduced from WB-ADB, 2005). The most urgent 
requirement of the education system is to resume classes at all levels. This would entail the 
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provision of temporary and semi-permanent alternative learning spaces, the repair of partly 
damaged schools, the provision of learning materials, the training of teachers to replace those who 
have perished, and the revival of education administrative structures. These short term measures 
are estimated to cost Rs. 1.2 billion. Over the medium to long term, destroyed schools will need to 
be rebuilt. This will involve the construction of new schools with earthquake-resistant design, 
classrooms, facilities, latrines and water supply, and the provision of learning materials, furniture, 
and equipment. Partly damaged schools will also need to be repaired and retrofitted, and continued 
teacher training will be required over the medium term. A substantial number of students in these 
areas may now have special learning needs that would additionally require new teaching 
approaches and school design modifications for improved accessibility of the disabled. 
 
Table 6.2 Short and Long Term Needs (WB-ADB, 2005)  
 Short-Term Medium-to Long-Term w/ Seismic Resist Total 
Schools and Temporary 1,000 23,646 24,646 
Structures    
Materials & Furniture 150 3,051 3,201 
Teacher Training 30 60 90 
Reconstruction Plan 60 60 120 
Administration Buildings N/A N/A  
Total 1,240 26,817 28,057 
 
6.2 IMPACT ON HEALTHCARE  
 
The damage to public health sector has been widespread and the WB estimates the loss to 
be in the amount of US$120 million (Rs. 7.1 billion). The report states that the immediate need is 
to treat more than 70,000 people with injuries. The earthquake’s impact also includes severe 
damage to health infrastructure and health systems, with 574 health facilities partially or fully 
damaged. Almost 75% of the first level care facilities have been either fully damaged or have 
suffered partial damage. The five District Headquarters Hospitals were completely destroyed, and 
the only tertiary health care facility in the region suffered structural damage. In addition, the 
smaller health units including Sub-Health Centers and First Aid Posts serving remote small 
mountainous hamlets have been destroyed. Besides the infrastructure, the majority of medical and 
office equipment, furniture, drugs and laboratories have been destroyed. In addition, official 
records, including the Health Management Information System (HMIS) data at the Director 
General Office in AJK and at the District level have been lost. These losses have resulted in a 
complete breakdown of the health system and a total disruption of both secondary and primary 
care service provision. 
 
The reconstruction and recovery cost is estimated at US$303 million (Rs. 18 billion; 
WB-ADB, 2005), and the suggested strategy is to carry out reconstruction in two overlapping 
phases. In the short term, the most urgent need is to ensure access to an essential health care 
package that reduces vulnerabilities and saves lives as the system is revitalized. The immediate 
focus is on the revitalization of the primary health care system, the provision of services in tented 
villages and for the newly disabled and psychological care for survivors and health care workers. 
The above assessment does not include the cost of damage to private health care system and 
indirect losses due to expenditure on treatment of survivors, public health interventions, loss of 
health staff and the impact of psychological trauma, which have not been computed. 
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6.3 SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE EARTHQUAKE 
 
The population and social fabric of the earthquake-hit areas have been seriously affected 
by the number of casualties. Reports vary but deaths are likely to be in excess of 80,000, injuries 
over 100,000 and about 2.8 million people are without shelter. These figures may still increase as 
the more remote of the affected areas are accessed. Women and children made up a large 
percentage of the victims, as many women were caught unaware in houses when the earthquake 
struck, and the collapse of school buildings resulted in the deaths of many children, perhaps as 
high as 50% of the total causalities. Among the injured, many will be permanently disabled due to 
spinal cord injuries, severe head injuries and injuries to limbs, resulting in a high proportion of 
amputations. Due to difficulties in access, many victims were not rescued in time for necessary 
medical attention. Furthermore, the number of permanent disabilities continues to increase, as 
untreated limb injuries have turned gangrenous and required amputations. In this regards, the 
reconstruction efforts require the development of mechanisms to provide long term care where 
needed, as well as support for rehabilitation, employment and skills development for people with 
disabilities. Reconstruction efforts also need to ensure that rebuilt facilities, especially schools, 
health facilities, and public offices, are accessible to people with disabilities. 
 
6.4 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE EARTHQUAKE 
 
The preliminary estimate of the overall cost associated with the earthquake is 
approximately US$5.2 billion (WB-ADB, 2005). This includes estimated costs for relief, 
livelihood support for victims, and reconstruction efforts. Of this amount, the direct damage 
sustained due to the earthquake total Rs. 135.1 billion (US$2.3 billion), as presented below in 
Table 6.3. These estimates are based on the book value of the assets. The largest component of this 
damage is to private housing, which amounts to Rs. 61.2 billion (US$1.03 billion), followed by 
damage to the transport sector totaling Rs. 20.2 billion (US$340 million), and to the education 
sector equaling Rs. 19.9 billion (US$335 million). Direct damage to agriculture and livestock is 
also sizeable, totaling Rs. 12.9 billion (US$218 million). The losses to industry and services 
amount to Rs. 8.6 billion (US$144 million). The indirect losses resulting from the direct damage 
are Rs. 34.2 billion (US$576 million). 
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Table 6.3 Preliminary Estimate of Total Losses and Reconstruction Costs (WB, ADB, 2005))  
Sector 
Direct 
Damage 
(Rs. mill.)
Indirect 
Losses 
(Rs. mill.)
Reconstruction
Costs* 
(Rs. mill.) 
Reconstruction 
Costs* 
(US$ mill.) 
Share of Total
Reconst. 
Costs (%) 
 1. Social Infrastructure             
    Private Housing**    61,220   7,218   92,160   1552    44  
    Health    7,114   1,378   18,012   303    9  
    Education    19,920   4,133   28,057   472    13  
    Environment    12    8,985   151    4  
    Public administration    2,971   687   4,254   72    2  
 2. Physical Infrastructure         
    Transport***    20,165   4,061   24,699   416    12  
    Water Supply and Sanitation    1,165    1,900   32    1  
    Irrigation    324    623   10    0  
    Energy, power and fuel    744   1,561   2,377   40    1  
 3. Economic Sectors****         
    Agriculture and livestock    12,933  6,770   17,846   300    9  
    Industry and Services    8,578   8,379   9,178   155    4  
 4. Total = 1+2+3 (in Rs. Million)   135,146   34,187   208,091   3,503    100  
 o/w : Azad Jammu and Kashmir    76,375   17,671   116,625   1,963    56  
        : North West Frontier Province  56,436   16,516   91,467   1,540    44  
 o/w : Public Assets    45,795   12,175   82,187   1,384    39  
        : Private Assets    87,015   22,012   125,904   2,120    61  
 o/w : Urban Areas    25,789   13,675   46,163   777    22  
        : Rural Areas    107,021   20,512   161,928   2,726    78  
Notes: * Includes cost of reconstruction of both immovable and movable assets and restoration of public services. 
           ** Includes value of household contents such as consumer durables; reconstruction costs exclude replacement of these 
 assets. 
           *** Includes roads and bridges. 
           **** Total losses and reconstruction costs in agriculture, industry and services are over and above what is accounted for by 
 the sectors listed above. 
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7. CLOSURE 
 
The Kashmir earthquake of October 8, 2005 inflicted a heavy toll on lives and livelihoods 
in a large region in northern Pakistan, Kashmir and even parts of northern India. It is in an active 
tectonic region where the Indian plate subducts under the Asian plate, creating an arc of high 
seismicity that was responsible for major earthquakes in the past. Whilst the earthquake had a 
magnitude of 7.6, the capability of the faults in the Himalayan region is for earthquakes of 
magnitude > 8.0, of which several are expected in the future. This Quicklook report gives a review 
of the damage and other consequences of the earthquake directly from the observations of the 
MAE Center-Rice University Team, as well as summarizes selected previous reports. 
Whereas definitive recommendations await further in-depth studies and interactions with 
authorities and researchers in Pakistan, the following preliminary recommendations for priorities 
and action are offered at this early stage: 
 
Hazard 
• Development of a national instrumentation program to deploy, operate and maintain a dense 
network of digital acceleration recording stations that covers not only the northern regions but 
the entire Pakistani territory, as well as a mandatory requirement for instrumenting all new 
projects with a minimum of sensing stations for the collection of vital response data. 
• Development of a micro-zonation program for areas of (i) special soil conditions, (ii) in the 
vicinity of large steep slopes, and (iii) on significant ridges. 
• Undertaking comprehensive seismic risk assessment studies using probabilistic hazard 
analysis (PSHA), deterministic studies for critical sites (DSHA), and time-dependent seismic 
hazard assessment, leading to nationally accepted hazard maps. 
 
Urban and Rural Planning 
• Development of a comprehensive multi-scale land use management policy and grand plan to 
gradually move population, business and infrastructure systems away from regions of the 
highest exposure to natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods. 
• Clearing congested old town centers gradually to widen streets and provide access to 
emergency services, and to construct using modern techniques, materials and codes of 
practice. 
• Implementation of planning permit guidelines to influence characteristics of buildings and 
bridges to reduce amplification effects taking into account site conditions and topography. 
• Development or adoption of a loss assessment software tool that is used in regional and 
national scenario loss assessments for the purposes of planning of response, stockpiling of 
required equipment and recruitment of necessary personnel. 
 
Design and Construction 
• Development of two levels of codes for design, one for detailed design of important facilities 
and large civil infrastructure projects, based on the latest technologies and international 
experience adapted to Pakistan, and the second as a set of ‘deemed-to-satisfy’ codes using 
local practice, regional languages, pictorial-visual presentations and no calculation 
requirements, for small family residences and similar structures, using indigenous materials. 
• Implementation of hierarchical, self-monitored, strict construction authorization procedures. 
This should include continuous control of all construction and concurrent penalties on 
defaulting, non-conforming and random housing. 
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• Mandating earthquake resistant design according to the published codes. 
• Development of codes for seismic resistance of infrastructure and lifeline systems. 
• Increasing the use of tunnels to reduce the impact of earthquakes on the transportation network 
in the mountainous regions. 
• Use of the most advanced tunnel design and construction practice to increase the reliability of 
tunnels as vital components of the transportation systems. 
 
Social Impact Reduction 
• Development of special policies for design and construction for critical facilities, primarily 
schools, hospitals, emergency response centers, power generation, water supply, gas supply 
and similar facilities critical to the operation of a complex societal system. 
• Mandating of disabled access provisions in all civil infrastructure works. 
• Planning of disabled support and rehabilitation centers taking into account the current 
distribution of residences of the large population of disabled citizens from the Kashmir 
earthquake. 
• Development of medium and long-term plan for widowed women and orphaned children in 
terms of a continuous and accessible support structure for rehabilitation, education and 
integration in other families. 
 
Legislation 
• Backing up all the above by rigorous legislative structures and clear frameworks for 
adherence. 
• Legislating for a complete and comprehensive framework of emergency management 
professionals at the local, regional and national levels, and a clear reporting mechanism, 
alongside a tiered emergency preparedness plan. 
• Establishing a ‘Disaster Fund’ that is used to provide emergency relief, and that is funded by a 
modest tax on new projects. Such funds have precedence and experience should be gained 
from other countries on this issue. 
 
The above list is not comprehensive and is subject to further refinement and articulation as more 
information becomes available and the needs are better defined. The investigative work continues 
at the MAE Center and Rice University and a detailed report including several case studies will be 
issued in due course. 
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APPENDICES 
 
A.1  FIELD MISSION MEMBERS AND SPECIALIZATION 
 
Name Technical Role Logistical Role 
Ahmad Jan Durrani (i) structural earthquake engineering; (ii) concrete structures Team Leader 
Amr Salah Elnashai (i) structural earthquake engineering; (ii) strong-motion effects Technical Leader 
Arif Masud (i) structural earthquake engineering; (ii) wave propagation 
Communications 
Coordinator in Pakistan 
Youssef Hashash (i) geotechnical earthquake engineering; (ii) engineering seismology 
Communications 
Coordinator in the USA
Sung Jig Kim (i) structural earthquake engineering; (ii) detailed back-analysis 
Documentation and 
Reporting Coordinator 
 
 
A.2  PAKISTANI HOST ORGANIZATIONS 
 
1. Higher Education Commission (HEC) 
2. Army Corps of Engineers 
3. Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) 
4. Halcrow Pakistan 
5. University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar (UET) 
6. National Engineering Services of Pakistan (NESPAK) 
7. Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) 
8. National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST) 
9. University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore 
10. Government College University, Lahore 
11. University of the Punjab 
12. Geological Survey of Pakistan 
13. Public Works Department, Highways, AJK 
14. Pakistan Meteorological Department 
15. Pakistan Engineering Council 
16. National Highway Authority 
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A.3 ITINERARY AND ROUTE  
 
November 5-15 2005, see also figures on next pages. 
 
Date Description 
Nov 5/6 Early AM Arrival in Lahore (except A.Masud) 
AM Internal meeting 
Nov 6 
PM 
Meeting at LUMS (Lahore University of Management Science) 
Meeting at HEC-Lahore (High Education Commission) with 
University of Punjab and University of Engineering and Technology, 
Lahore 
AM Meeting with NESPAK (National Engineering Services – Pakistan) Fly to Islamabad Nov 7 
PM Meeting at HEC-Islamabad 
AM Meeting at Pakistan Geologic Survey 
Nov 8 
PM Depart for Earthquake Zone to Abbottabad, Mansera and Hazara University 
AM Survey Damage from Abbottabad to Balakot, 
Nov 9 
PM Balakot, Drive through Gheri Habibullah Khan, Muzaffarabad, to Murree/ PC Burbhan 
AM Survey damage from Murree to Muzaffarabad 
Nov 10 
PM 
Meeting with Army Corps of Engineers in Muzaffarabad, and further 
damage survey 
Return to Islamabad 
AM 
Meeting at: 
• NHA (National Highway Authority) with lecture and questions 
and answer session 
• Meeting with Army Engineers Nov 11 
PM 
• Meeting with NESPAK 
• Meeting with Pakistan Engineering Council, and Army Corp of 
Engineers 
AM Team Returns to US, except A. Masud Meeting with rector-NUST 
Nov 12 
PM 
• Visit Margala Towers 
• Meeting with Planning Division 
• Meeting with Army Engineers 
Nov 13  Meeting with HEC 
Nov 14 PM Meeting with GIK and WAPDA 
Nov 15 AM A. Masud returns to US 
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Figure A.1 General map of Pakistan showing major cities, international borders and earthquake epicenter 
 
 
 
Figure A.2 Map of northern Pakistan showing major cities and routes visited by MCRU team. thick color lines 
represent gps logs of the routes. 
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Figure A.3 Close up view of the areas visited with the heaviest damage 
 
 
Figure A.4 Close up satellite view of Balakot and the route taken by the MCRU team shown in yellow. 
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Figure A.5 Close up view of areas visited in Muzaffarabad. Pink line 
 
